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  This paper will focus on FDA regulation under the Delaney Clause, and 
particularly regulations that have led to contradictory results.  It first will examine the 
history and basic requirements of the Delaney Clause.  It next will discuss cancer:  
statistics regarding the frequency, types, and causes of cancer.  Then it will examine 
some foods and food additives that have been associated with some level of 
carcinogenicity and how FDA has handled them.  It will conclude by discussing the 
inherent problems that the Delaney Clause presents in establishing a uniform system of 
regulation and, finally, by proposing some potential alternative ways in which FDA 
might better use its power to help the public avoid excessive exposure to carcinogenic 
food substances.1 
 
The Delaney Clause has been a source of controversy since its enactment in 1958.  
This paper first will chronicle the history of the Clause, and of FDA regulation under the 
Clause, and then will examine some of the contradictory decisions in regulation that the 
Delaney Clause has led FDA to make.  It will focus on some of the contradictory 
decisions stemming from the Clause as applied to food additives, both among themselves 
and in opposition to natural, whole foods.  This paper will be limited to the regulation of 
specific additives and will not address the (albeit quite important) issues of contaminated 
foods fed to animals, color additives, or pesticides. 
I.  The Delaney Clause 
  The Delaney Clause, a 1958 amendment to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act of 1938, states that “the Secretary of the Food and Drug Administration shall not 
approve for use in food any chemical additive found to induce cancer in man, or, after 
tests, found to induce cancer in animals.”
1  Congress considered the addition of the 
Clause to the Act to be necessary out of fear that, without it, the public regularly would 
encounter carcinogens in their foods.
2  
  A.  History 
In the 1940s, relatively early in the history of FDA regulation, and well before the 
enactment of the Delaney Clause, the agency established a rule for potentially toxic, 
though not carcinogenic, substances:  the safe human dose of a substance was considered 
to be 1/100 of the highest dose that caused no toxic effects in laboratory test animals (a 
                                                 
1 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A). 
2 Al Meyerhoff, The Delaney Clause: Point/Counterpoint, 19 EPA J. 42, 42 (1993). 2 
level that now is known as the “no observed adverse effect level” (NOAEL)).
3  Such a 
safety factor, or level of tolerance, however, was never considered to be permissible 
among carcinogenic (or potentially carcinogenic) substances.
4  For these substances, 
FDA always has used a no-tolerance method of regulation; the agency banned two coal-
tar colors that were known to be potentially carcinogenic in the 1940s as well as two 
artificial sweeteners and natural tonka beans and coumarin, a constituent of the tonka 
beans, in the 1950s.
5 
The first drafts of the Food Additives Amendment did not contain any version of 
the Delaney Clause.
6  In 1957, Congressman James Delaney revised his bill with the 
Clause’s first articulation:  “The Secretary shall not approve for use in food any chemical 
additive found to induce cancer in man, or, after tests, found to induce cancer in 
animals.”
7  
On July 23, 1957, the Secretary of the United States Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (HEW) noted his objection to the Delaney Clause in a letter, 
stating that the Clause was not necessary; he noted that, if a food additive were found to 
cause cancer at the rate it which it was normally used, it would be declared unsafe by 
other means and, thus, be banned from the food supply without what he considered the 
unnecessary addition of the Delaney Clause.
8  The Secretary went on to assert that the 
Clause was overly broad in that it did not require food additives to be tested in the way 
that they would normally be used; he noted that “[s]cientists … can produce cancer in test 
                                                 
3 PETER BARTON HUTT, RICHARD A. MERRILL & LEWIS A. GROSSMAN, FOOD AND DRUG LAW 1120 (2007).  
4 Id. at 1121. 
5 15 Fed. Reg. 321 (1950); 19 Fed. Reg. 1239 (1954). 
6 Frederick H. Degnan, Esq. and W. Gary Flamm, Ph.D., Living with and Reforming the Delaney Clause, 
50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 235, 237 (1995). 
7 H.R. 7798, 85
th Cong., 1
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8 Food Additives, Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 
85th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 171 (1958). 3 
animals by injecting sugar in a certain manner, and they can produce cancers by 
injections into test animals of cottonseed oil, olive oil, or tannic acid (a component of 
many foods).”
9  He also noted the potential absurd consequences, if the Delaney Clause 
were strictly enforced, of “rul[ing] out of the food supply sugar, vegetable oils, or 
common table beverages simply because, by an extraordinary method of application 
never encountered at the dining table, it is possible to induce cancer by injecting the 
substances into the muscles of test animals.”
10 
In 1958, a new food additives bill was reported out of committee without the 
inclusion of an anti-carcinogen clause.
11  After the bill was filed, Congressman Delaney 
argued for the inclusion of such a clause.
12  The Assistant HEW Secretary Elliot 
Richardson reiterated in a letter that the Clause was unnecessary; however, he stated that 
he would not object to a revised bill providing for appropriate tests.
13  In 1960, Congress 
included the Delaney Clause in the listing provisions of the Color Additives 
Amendments.   
The Delaney Clause now appears in three separate parts of the Federal Food, 
Drugs, and Cosmetic Act of 1938: § 409 on food additives,
14 § 512 on animal drugs in 
meat and poultry,
15 and § 721 on color additives.
16  The prohibition in § 409 originally 
applied to pesticide residues as well; however, the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 
removed pesticide use from the prohibitive regulations of the Delaney Clause.  The 
primary focus of this paper will be on the Delaney Clause as applied to food additives, 
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11 H.R. 13,254, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). 
12 Living with and Reforming the Delaney Clause, supra note 6, at 237. 
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14 21 U.S.C. § 348 (1982). 
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16 21 U.S.C. § 376 (1982). 4 
without examination of pesticide use.  In particular, it will examine the contradictory 
results of applying it to food additives when carcinogenic substances naturally present in 
foods, or that form in ways such that they are not affirmatively added by human 
processes, are not so regulated. 
B.  Controversiality 
  The Delaney Clause is notoriously controversial, due to its potential for 
overreaching and even (according to some with staunchly pro-regulatory views) for 
underreaching as well as its numerous uncertainties regarding term definitions and how 
properly to apply the Clause to the wide variety of food additives currently used.  In 
1958, when the Delaney Clause was first adopted, only four substances were known to 
cause cancer in humans: soot, radiation, tobacco smoke, and beta-naphthylamine.
17  By 
the 1970s, however, new scientific technology rendered determination of carcinogenicity 
much more sensitive, having increased between two and five orders of magnitude 
between the years 1958 and 1978.
18  Carcinogens were, by the 1980s, detectable at the 
parts-per-trillion level, up to a million times more sensitive than the rate at which they 
could be detected in 1958.
19  Currently, the world is significantly different than it was in 
1958, and ability to detect small potentiality for carcinogenicity in foods continues to 
increase; some (albeit often infinitesimally small) potential carcinogenic effect is 
detectable in a hugely significant number of foods and food additives. 
  1.  Quantitative risk assessment 
Thus, to make the Delaney Clause possible to implement, FDA adopted a 
quantitative risk assessment method to evaluate such carcinogenicity.  Rather than 
                                                 
17 51 Fed. Reg. 28331, 28343 (1986). 
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19 Id.  5 
banning a substance with a truly infinitesimal possibility of being carcinogenic, for FDA 
to declare a substance to be unsafe under the Delaney Clause, the substance must result in 
a risk to humans of more than one in one million of developing cancer over one’s 
lifetime.
20   
Quantitative risk assessment first was used only to regulate carcinogenic animal 
drugs; however, by 1980, FDA had begun using the method of quantitative risk 
assessment to determine the potential carcinogenicity of constituents in food, drugs, and 
medical devices, as well as cosmetics.
21  Color additives are subject to stricter regulation 
than are most food additives, however:  any risk of cancer in animals, even as small a risk 
to humans as one in nineteen billion over a person’s lifetime, renders color additives 
unsafe under FDA standards.
22 
Quantitative risk assessment, though ostensibly preventing overregulation (at least 
to an extent) of food additives with real though negligent carcinogenic potential, did not 
come without its own problems and controversiality.  The method involves “the 
mathematical extrapolation from high-dose laboratory animal data to derive estimates of 
the cancer risk associated with much lower human exposures from the consumer 
products.”
23   
The uncertainties in the process of quantitative risk assessment render it necessary 
to make certain assumptions, which regulators normally do in the most conservative 
manner that is appropriate to avoid underestimating the risk of a substance’s potential 
                                                 
20 D. Feinberg, A Cookbook for a Consistent Food Safety Standard for Carcinogenic Foods: Looking to the 
Ingredients of a Food Rather Than Its Recipe, 5 J. PHARMACY & L. 67, 76 (1995). 
21 FOOD AND DRUG LAW, supra note 3, at 1139. 
22 Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
23 FOOD AND DRUG LAW, supra note 3, at 1139. 6 
carcinogenicity to humans.
24  Therefore, regulators generally assume laboratory animals 
to be appropriate models for determining risk to humans, use data from the most sensitive 
sex of the most sensitive species for testing purposes, consider benign tumors to be 
malignant for purposes of evaluation, and assume the relationship between dose of a food 
additive and physiological response of the treated laboratory animals to be linear (rather 
than having the response to the initial dose be greater than the response of additional 
amounts, leading to a curved response, a response that often is true in reality).
25  Thus, 
quantitative risk assessment leads to worst-case estimates in many cases, providing data 
that may overestimate a food additive’s carcinogenic potential by several orders of 
magnitude.
26 
  2.  GRAS exception 
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act provides further complicates the Delaney 
Clause with its GRAS (generally recognized as safe) exception.  The Act defines a “food 
additive” as  
any  substance  the  intended  use  of  which  results  or  may  reasonably  be 
expected to result, directly or indirectly, in its becoming a component or 
otherwise  affecting  the  characteristics  of  any  food  (including  any 
substance  intended  for  use  in  producing,  manufacturing,  packing, 
processing, preparing, treating, packaging, transporting, or holding food; 
and including any source of radiation intended for any such use), if such 
substance  is  not  generally  recognized,  among  experts  qualified  by 
scientific training and experience to evaluate its safety, as having been 
                                                 
24 Id.  
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adequately  shown  through  scientific  procedures  (or,  in  the  case  of  a 
substance used in food prior to January 1, 1958, through either scientific 
procedures or experience based on common use in food) to be safe under 
the conditions of its intended use; except that such term does not include 
…  (4)  any  substance  used  in  accordance  with  a  sanction  or  approval 
granted prior to the enactment of this paragraph 4 pursuant to this Act, the 
Poultry Products Inspection Act … or the Meat Inspection Act of March 4, 
1907….
27 
Therefore, products that were in use prior to 1958 generally are subject to less strict 
regulation, leading some people to accuse the Delaney Clause, and even the entire Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as unfairly penalizing new substances over those that have been 
eaten for many years in the past.
28   
As noted above, a substance may be declared GRAS either through scientific 
procedures or through experience based on common use in food prior to 1958.  To 
establish safety through scientific procedures requires the same amount (both quantitative 
and qualitative) of scientific evidence that would be required for the substance’s approval 
as a food additive and ordinarily if the approval were to be based upon published studies, 
which may be substantiated by unpublished studies as well as by other data and 
information.
29  For a substance to obtain GRAS status through experience based on 
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ADMINISTRATION, 
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common use in foods, there must be a “substantial history of consumption for food use by 
a significant number of consumers.”
30 
  3.  De minimis exception 
  Because of the current potential for detecting miniscule amounts of 
possible  carcinogenicity  of  so  many  commonly-consumed  foods,  FDA  has 
adopted  something  akin  to  a  de  minimis  exception  in  applying  the  Delaney 
Clause. The policy was necessary to prevent bringing thousands of foods under 
Delaney Clause regulation because of the high numbers of commonly-eaten foods 
that do have a trace amount of a known carcinogenic substance present either 
naturally or because of an unavoidable processing step.
31 
C. What qualifies as GRAS 
  As mentioned, a substance that is declared to be generally recognized as safe 
(“GRAS”) is exempt from regulation under the Delaney Clause.  To qualify as GRAS, as 
noted, a substance must be shown to have had a substantial history of consumption by a 
significant number of consumers in the United States.
32  The substance must be safe in its 
intended use (prohibiting, therefore, GRAS status for all uses of a product that may be 
safe only for a limited or specific use).
33   
The GRAS exception, similar to the Delaney Clause itself, has been accused of 
favoring old, established substances over newer ones, and even favoring established uses 
of some particular substance over a new use for the same substance.  Such favor is 
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31 A Cookbook for a Consistent Food Safety Standard, supra note 20, at 79.  
32 41 Fed. Reg. 53600 (1976). 
33 United States v. An Article of Food, 752 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1985) (in which the court held that, though 
nitrates naturally are present in vegetables and have been used to cure meat for much time, potassium 
nitrate could not be considered GRAS when used in drinks). 9 
asserted even though a substance may have its GRAS status revoked if evidence casts 
doubt on its safety,
34 primarily because of how unlikely it is that FDA will revoke a 
commonly-consumed product’s GRAS status.
35  
FDA officially refuses to recognize any known carcinogenic substance as 
GRAS.
36  However, because many natural foods are recognized as carcinogenic to some 
degree, FDA makes an exception (similar to the de minimis exception to the Delaney 
Clause) and permits a natural substance to remain GRAS even if it contains substances 
found to cause cancer in test animals even though a substance that itself is carcinogenic is 
forbidden from maintaining its GRAS status.
37 
D. What qualifies as added 
  If a substance is determined to be added, the manufacturer has the burden of proof 
regarding its safety; if a substance, on the other hand, is an actual food, however, FDA 
has the burden of proving its harmfulness.
38  Because the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
does not define “added substance,” determining its meaning has been left to FDA and the 
courts, who have come up with two distinct standards.  The inherency standard declares 
all substances that are not inherent in the natural state of a food to be added.
39  The 
agency theory, however, considers a substance to be added only if at least a small amount 
is present because of human intervention.
40  The standard that FDA officially recognizes 
is the inherency standard.
41 
                                                 
34 41 Fed. Reg. 53600. 
35 See A Cookbook for a Consistent Food Safety Standard, supra note 20, at 80. 
36 See, e.g., 34 Fed. Reg. 17063 (1969) (FDA’s decision to remove cyclamate from its GRAS list after 
learning of evidence of its carcinogenicity).  
37 A Cookbook for a Consistent Food Safety Standard, supra note 20, at 81. 
38 See, e.g., United States v. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co., 323 U.S. 399, 411 (1914). 
39 See, e.g., United States v. Boston Farm Center, Inc., 590 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1979). 
40 See, e.g., Continental Seafoods, Inc. v. Schweiker, 674 F.2d 38, 43 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
41 A Cookbook for a Consistent Food Safety Standard, supra note 20, at 81. 10 
Though the difference between the two standards initially may seem trivial, under 
certain situations, applying each standard to a substance would yield a far different result 
for purposes of FDA regulation.  Certain substances, for example, such as aflatoxins in 
peanuts and corn are neither inherent in the natural state of the food nor added by human 
intervention; instead, aflatoxins result from mold growing on the foods.
42  If these 
aflatoxins are considered added substances, they will be regulated under the harsher “may 
render injurious” standard; if, however, they are not considered to be added, their 
regulation merely will be under the “ordinarily injurious” standard.
43  If the agency 
theory were to be applied, the aflatoxins would not be considered added substances; 
however, FDA’s inherency standard causes them to be considered added.  Thus, under 
FDA’s inherency standard, peanuts with aflatoxins, not present in the peanuts’ natural 
state yet not present due to human intervention, are subject to harsher regulation by FDA 
than are foods whose harmful, or potentially carcinogenic, characteristics are inherent in 
their natural states. 
E.  Remaining problems 
1.  What is a carcinogen 
  Determining carcinogenicity would seem to be rather straightforward:  any 
substance that is directly involved in causing cancer (one would think) should, under the 
common understanding of the term, be deemed a carcinogen. 
Determining carcinogenicity for purposes of the Delaney Clause prohibitions, 
however, actually is a highly complex process.  The Clause itself is notoriously silent on 
which substances should be classified as carcinogens.  Applying the sweepingly broad 
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definition mentioned above is nearly impossible, or at least would be highly problematic, 
because the current scientific technology renders it difficult not to detect at least a small 
possibility of carcinogenicity in almost any given food.
44  The most sensible way to 
distinguish those products that should be deemed carcinogenic under the Delaney Clause 
is to require them to pass a certain threshold either of the magnitude of potential harm 
they could cause or of their likelihood to cause such harm. 
  Just how potent a carcinogen a substance must be, or how likely to cause cancer 
the substance must be, to be classified as a carcinogen for Delaney Clause purposes is not 
the only problem.  Even after determining what qualifies as a carcinogen (i.e., setting the 
standards) is settled, there remains the issue of accuracy of determining what qualifies 
(i.e., which products meet the previously-determined standards).  The nature of the 
Delaney Clause renders it easily possible that, even when starting with identical data in 
risk assessments, predictions may vary over several orders of magnitude, depending on 
assumptions that go into each model.
45  
As noted, predictions made when performing quantitative risk assessment of a 
potential carcinogen tend to be greatly overestimated due to fear of the opposite 
inaccuracy: no regulator wants to underestimate the potential risk of a product, deeming it 
to be safer than it actually is. However, even though these carcinogenicity predictions 
universally tend to be inaccurate by being overestimated, they may also be quite 
imprecise by varying greatly from each other. 
2.  Cost-benefit analysis 
                                                 
44 Leticia M. Diaz, Sucralose: The Sugar of the New Millennium – FDA’s Role: A Hindrance or a Help, 34 
N.E. L. REV. 363, 372 (2000). 
45 Al Meyerhoff, The Delaney Clause: Point/Counterpoint, 19 EPA J. 42, 42 (1993). 12 
  Many people have stated that the Delaney Clause should include a form of cost-
benefit analysis.
46  According to these people, informed consumers should have the right 
to decide whether to consume a particular substance even if it is known to cause a small 
increase in likelihood of developing cancer.
47  This right particularly valid, goes the 
argument, because of the current technological possibility of detecting such a small 
likelihood of carcinogenicity and the near certainty that technology will only continue to 
develop, allowing for detection of even smaller likelihoods in the future.
48   
Supporters of allowing a cost-benefit analysis utilization in Delaney Clause 
regulation have argued that the current system does, and will continue to, paternalistically 
prevent an individual consumer from purchasing products whose benefit to her, given her 
personal physical and medical history (considering, inter alia, factors such as obesity or 
diabetes in a consumer’s choice to purchase and consume potentially harmful artificial 
sweeteners), may far outweigh a small risk of developing cancer many years later.  The 
obese or diabetic consumer may find the long-term small risk of developing cancer by 
consuming a product that contains saccharin to be preferable to the short-term, far more 
certain, risk of dangerous weight gain or blood sugar problems that would result from 
consuming a similar product made with sucrose. 
The argument in favor of using cost-benefit analysis in Delaney Clause 
regulation, however, assumes perfect knowledge by consumers, an assumption that 
nearly never holds true.  Opponents of a cost-benefit analysis mechanism in Delaney 
Clause regulation may argue that, in reality, most consumers are unaware of even the 
                                                 
46 Sucralose: The Sugar of the New Millennium, supra note 44, at 372–73. 
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48 Id. (using the example that a diabetic may continue to consume products containing saccharin, aware of 
the substance’s potential carcinogenicity, rather than consuming products containing sugar, which nearly 
certainly would cause harm, or avoid eating any sweetened foods). 13 
most basic risks associated with various products. Consumers often tend to believe that, if 
a product is on the market, it is safe for human consumption.  If FDA suddenly were to 
begin permitting potential carcinogenic substances to be marketed and consumed, 
opponents could argue, the public still may assume all marketed substances to be 
harmless.   
Even if a consumer were aware of the simple fact that a substance may be 
somewhat carcinogenic, the chance that he will both know and understand the exact risk 
to the public at large is quite small, and the likelihood that he will know and understand 
the risk to himself in particular (considering his age, gender, race, family history, health, 
eating and exercise habits, etc.) is nearly nonexistent.  
Such an information problem is not unsolvable, however.  The benefits of 
permitting cost-benefit analysis for substances that only have a small, even borderline-
trivial, possibility of carcinogenicity are great.  If FDA were to undertake a public 
information campaign regarding their new strategy, and perhaps develop a website on 
which information could be obtained for risk to an individual of consuming a product 
given her individual factors and the amount of the product she consumes, the public 
certainly would have much more access to knowledge of a product’s particular risk to 
herself.   
Labels on products containing the potential carcinogenic substance would be 
necessary as well to inform potential consumers of the risk of carcinogenicity, possibly 
with some form of coding to allow consumers to determine which potential carcinogens 
pose the greatest risks, and which merely pose risks that only barely failed being small 
enough to be ruled de minimis. 14 
This would involve much work on FDA’s part.  The agency would need to 
determine not only the fact that a particular substance is potentially carcinogenic, but the 
exact potential harm to various subgroups of the population.  FDA would be required to 
complete an information campaign and mandate labels on potentially carcinogenic 
products.  Whether such a strategy, however beneficial it may be, will ever come to pass 
seems unlikely, due to both the controversy it almost certainly would cause and the extra 
work and expenditures it would require on FDA’s part. 
II.  Cancer 
  Cancer is one of the most feared diagnoses of patients worldwide.  Many people 
are rightfully concerned about the potential of various foods to cause cancer.  Before 
examining such potential, it is important to learn some background information about 
cancer. 
  A.  United States statistics 
  The estimated number of new cases of cancer diagnosed in the United States in 
2010 was 1,529,560.
49  Roughly 11.4 million Americans who have had cancer of some 
form were alive in January 2006.
50  Approximately 569,490 people were expected to die 
of cancer in the United States in 2010, giving an approximate daily death rate of roughly 
1,500 people per day.
51 
  Cancer, aside from costing people their lives, is quite costly monetarily due to 
both treatment and lost productivity of cancer victims.  The National Institute of Health 
                                                 
49 Cancer Facts and Figures 2010, AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, 
http://www.cancer.org/acs/groups/content/@epidemiologysurveilance/documents/document/acspc-
026238.pdf at 1 (last visited March 2011) (hereinafter “Cancer Facts and Figures”. 
50 Id.  
51 Id. at 2. 15 
estimated the overall costs of cancer to reach $263.8 billion in 2010 alone.
52  Of this, 
$102.8 billion would be from direct medical costs, $20.9 billion would be from indirect 
morbidity costs (workers’ lost productivity due to illness), and $140.1 billion was 
estimated to result from indirect mortality costs (workers’ lost productivity due to their 
premature death).
53 
Males have a 44.29 percent chance of developing, and being diagnosed with, 
cancer of an invasive site in their lifetimes; females’ chance is slightly lower at 37.76 
percent.
54  A male’s risk of dying from such a cancer is 23.3 percent, while a female’s 
chance of so dying is 19.58 percent.
55  The most common forms of cancer in males are 
prostate (16.22 percent chance of diagnosis, 2.79 percent chance of resulting death), lung 
and bronchus (7.67 percent chance of diagnosis, 6.95 percent chance of resulting death), 
colorectal (5.3 percent chance of diagnosis, 2.17 percent chance of resulting death), and 
bladder (3.8 percent chance of diagnosis, 0.85 percent chance of resulting death).
56  In 
females, the most common forms of cancer are breast (12.15 percent chance of diagnosis, 
2.81 percent chance of resulting death), lung and bronchus (6.35 percent chance of 
diagnosis, 5.05 percent chance of resulting death), colorectal (4.97 percent chance of 
diagnosis, 2.01 percent chance of resulting death), and uterine corpus (2.58 percent 
chance of diagnosis, 0.53 percent chance of resulting death).
57 
B.  Environmental factors 
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  Some forms of cancer are hereditary; such cancers, however, account for only five 
to ten percent of all cancer cases.
58  The focus of this paper primarily will be on cancers 
caused by environmental factors.  Many factors influence a person’s chances of 
developing or dying from cancer, including his socioeconomic status, race or ethnicity, 
and geographic location.
59  Regardless of race or ethnicity factors, those with lower 
socioeconomic status have disproportionately higher death rates from cancer than those 
with higher socioeconomic status; those having twelve or fewer years of formal education 
experience more than double the rate of cancer mortality of those with higher levels of 
education.
60  
Race also may be significant in an individual’s risk of developing cancer in his 
lifetime.  Cancer incidence rates per 100,000 members of the relevant population were, 
from 2002 through 2006, 550.1 for white males, 420.0 for white females, 626.0 for 
African-American males, 389.5 for African-American females, 334.5 for Asian-
American or Pacific Islander males, 276.3 for Asian-American or Pacific Islander 
females, 318.4 for Native American or Alaskan males, 261.4 for Native American or 
Alaskan females, 430.3 for Hispanic or Latino males, and 326.8 for Hispanic or Latino 
females.
61  Cancer death rates in the same time frame per 100,000 were 226.7 for white 
males, 157.3 for white females, 304.2 for African-American males, 183.7 for African-
American females, 135.4 for Asian-American or Pacific Islander males, 95.1 for Asian-
American or Pacific Islander females, 183.3 for Native American or Alaskan males, 
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and-cancer (last visited March 2011). 
59 Cancer Facts and Figures, supra note 49, at 38–40. 
60 Id. at 38. 
61 Id. at 39. 17 
140.1 for Native American or Alaskan females, 154.8 for Hispanic or Latino males, and 
103.9 for Hispanic or Latino females.
62 
Geographic locations also may affect a person’s chances of developing, and of 
dying from, at least some forms of cancer.  Lung cancer death rates in Kentucky (the state 
with the highest rates) per 100,000 are 108 in men and 56 in women, three times as high 
as those in Utah (with the lowest rates), which are 33 in men and 18 in women.
63  
Disparities present in each group, however, likely are at least partially due to inequities in 
work, income, wealth, education, housing, standard of living, and access to proper cancer 
treatment and detection services.
64  
One in three cancer deaths are related to the victim’s diet and activity.
65  The main 
risk factors for cancer are smoking, not maintaining a healthy body weight, lack of 
exercise, and poor food choices.
66  Smoking accounts for at least thirty percent of all 
cancer-related deaths, 87 percent of which are from lung cancer.
67  As compared to 
lifelong nonsmokers, male smokers have 23 times the risk of developing lung cancer, and 
female smokers have thirteen times the risk.
68  Lung cancer is not the only form of cancer 
associated with smoking, however.  Smoking may increase a person’s risk for at least 
fifteen types of cancer, including stomach, kidney, bladder, and pancreatic cancers, as 
well as acute myeloid leukemia.
69  Recent studies also have shown a possible, though still 
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uncertain, connection between smoking and colorectal, ovarian, and female breast 
cancers.
70 
  Poor nutrition and lack of physical activity account for roughly one in three 
cancer deaths in the United States; a significant part of this causation is due to the weight 
increase resulting from such choices.
71  Certainly, as many people are aware, eating more 
fruits, vegetables, and whole grains while consuming less processed and red meats can 
reduce one’s chances of developing cancer.
72  However, what about particular foods that 
may be carcinogenic or contain carcinogenic ingredients?  How dangerous are these in a 
person’s life, and how much cancer do such foods account for? 
  Exposure to carcinogenic agents in occupational settings accounts for roughly 
four percent of cancer deaths; such exposure from environmental pollutants, both 
manmade and naturally occurring, accounts for approximately two percent of cancer 
deaths.
73  Though the percentages sound small, they may account for up to 34,000 deaths 
in the United States.
74  The next section will examine in more detail some of the 
carcinogens that cause these cancer deaths, focusing on carcinogenic foods and food 
additives. 
III.  Carcinogens 
  Carcinogen is a broad term, encompassing materials the exposure to which may 
increase the incidence of cancer.
75  The term may apply to such various substances as 
chemicals (i.e., benzene), fibrous materials (i.e., asbestos), metals and physical agents 
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(i.e., x-rays, ultraviolet light), or exposures linked to particular industries or occupations 
(i.e., nickel refining).
76 
  Carcinogens are identified normally either by animal testing or epidemiological 
studies.
77  As discussed earlier, this paper primarily will focus on carcinogens as related 
to the Delaney Clause, which does not itself provide a definition for the term.  The Clause 
fails to provide specific guidelines for how carcinogenic an additive must be to be 
considered a carcinogen for its purposes, largely because Congress, when enacting the 
Delaney Clause, could not (or at least did not) foresee the current ability of scientific 
technology to detect remarkably small chances of carcinogenicity in several commonly-
consumed foods. 
A.  Ethyl alcohol 
  One commonly-consumed substance that increases the risk of cancer is ethyl 
alcohol (ethanol); approximately two to four percent of cancer cases are thought to be 
caused, either directly or indirectly, by ethyl alcohol.
78  A strong correlation between 
ethyl alcohol use and the potential for development of cancers of the esophagus, pharynx, 
and mouth exists, as well as a more controversial association between the use of ethyl 
alcohol and liver, breast, and colorectal cancers.
79  The United States Department of 
Health and Human Services has listed ethyl alcohol as a known carcinogen.  Obviously, 
however, ethyl alcohol is not forbidden under the Delaney Clause, having been declared 
GRAS by FDA. This section will examine some of the carcinogenic potential of ethyl 
alcohol. 
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    1.  Upper digestive tract cancers 
Epidemiological research has shown a strong correlation between the use of ethyl 
alcohol and occurrences of cancer in the upper digestive tract (esophagus, mouth, 
pharynx, and larynx).
80  Roughly 75 percent of esophageal cancer cases in the United 
States are due to consumption of ethyl alcohol, normally chronic alcohol abuse.
81  Similar 
abuse of ethyl alcohol is thought to be responsible for nearly one-half of all cases of 
cancer of the mouth, larynx, and pharynx.
82  The United States National Cancer Institute 
has stated that the risk of developing these cancers, as well as the risk of liver cancer, 
increases after only approximately one daily drink (twelve ounces of regular beer, five 
ounces of wine, or 1.5 ounces of eighty-proof liquor) for women and after two such daily 
drinks for men.
83 
    2.  Liver cancer 
  Heavy use of ethyl alcohol also has been associated with liver cancer, though the 
cancer normally is caused by cirrhosis, which in turn is caused by alcohol abuse.
84  
Roughly five percent of those with cirrhosis develop liver cancer as a result.
85  Some 
believe that up to 36 percent of cases of liver cancer in the United States are caused by 
ethyl alcohol abuse.
86 
    3.  Breast cancer 
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  Chronic use of ethyl alcohol may increase a woman’s chance of developing breast 
cancer by roughly ten percent.
87  Some studies, however, have found that ethyl alcohol 
has no effect on likelihood of developing breast cancer.
88  Recent studies have shown that 
ethyl alcohol increases levels of estrogen in premenopausal women, which may lead to an 
increased risk of developing breast cancer.
89  Institutions listing ethyl alcohol as a risk 
factor for developing breast cancer include the American Cancer Society,
90 Cancer 
Research UK,
91 the National Cancer Institute,
92 and the American Society of Clinical 
Oncology.
93  If a woman consumes an average of two drinks per day, her risk for 
developing breast cancer is approximately eight percent higher than if she averages one 
drink per day.
94 
    4.  Colon cancer 
  A small correlation between consumption of ethyl alcohol and a risk of 
developing colon cancer appears to exist; however, although the epidemiological studies 
showing the existence of a correlation controlled for fiber and other dietary factors, the 
studies are insufficient to show causality.
95  Despite the lack of complete certainty, many 
noteworthy institutions list ethyl alcohol as a risk factor for colorectal cancer, including 
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the National Cancer Institute, 
96 the Colorectal Cancer Coalition,
97 Cancer Research,
98 the 
Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center,
99 the American Cancer Society,
100 and the 
Mayo Clinic.
101 
  5.  Other cancers 
Some studies have shown a correlation between chronic abuse of ethyl alcohol 
and an increased risk in developing cancer of the stomach, pancreas, and lungs; the 
association is weak, however, and most studies have shown no such correlation.
102  
According to some studies, a higher intake of ethyl alcohol also has been associated with 
cancer of the endometrium,
103 ovaries,
104 prostate,
105 and small intestines.
106  Such 
associations are far from certain, and studies frequently have produced contrary results, 
showing ethyl alcohol either not to be a factor or even to have an inverse association with 
the form of cancer, providing an antioxidant effect.
107 
  B.  Artificial sweeteners 
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  Some of the most controversial food additives, though they are some of the most 
clinically tested, are artificial sweeteners, or sugar substitutes.  The six sugar substitutes 
approved for use in the United States by FDA are saccharin, aspartame, sucralose, 
neotame, and acesulfame potassium (all of which are artificial sweeteners)
108 and stevia 
(which is a natural sugar substitute).  Not all sugar substitutes are carcinogenic; in fact, 
though they are often some of the substances most associated with carcinogenicity, most 
have been shown not to be carcinogenic whatsoever.  
All sugar substitutes, however, like most food additives of any sort, have been 
heavily studied, tested, and regulated by FDA at some point.  FDA regulates sugar 
substitutes as food additives.  Stevia is a natural substance in use before 1958 and, hence, 
is exempt from Delaney Clause regulation because it falls under FDA’s GRAS policy.  
The other sweeteners, however, do fall under the Delaney Clause and, if the Clause is 
applied strictly, the sugar substitutes must not be carcinogenic whatsoever to remain on 
the market and be permissible for public consumption. 
Several natural sugar substitutes exist; some of the most common of these in the 
United States include maltitol, xylitol, isomalt, sorbitol, and inulin.  FDA long ago 
banned some of the more uncontroversially-considered dangerous (due either to potential 
toxicity or carcinogenicity) artificial sweeteners, including dulcin and P-4000.  Other 
such sugar substitutes, such as lead acetate, were considered dangerous long ago and are 
no longer in use.  The primary focus here will be on the regulation of FDA-approved 
sugar substitutes (including, for the sake of comparison, even those sweeteners for which 
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no evidence exists as to potential carcinogenicity) and on cyclamate, which FDA banned 
in 1969. 
    1.  Sucralose 
  Sucralose, most commonly known by its brand name, Splenda, is a non-nutritive, 
high-intensity (roughly six hundred times sweeter than sucrose, or table sugar) sweetener 
that is made from sucrose.
109  The body, however, does not metabolize sucralose as it 
does sucrose, so sucralose is able to provide the taste of sucrose without the calories.
110  
Sucralose is not metabolized, but instead moves rapidly through the body; it does not 
accumulate in the body.
111  Sucralose provides a further benefit for diabetic consumers: 
the sweetener appears not to raise blood sugar.
112  Sucralose can be used for baking 
purposes because of its stability to heat.
113  The sweetener has become quite popular in 
recent years. 
  FDA approved sucralose for use in the United States on April 1, 1998 after more 
than 110 human and animal studies showed it to be completely safe and free from any 
harmful side effects.
114  Twenty-eight countries already had permitted sucralose to be 
sold on the market before FDA’s approval, including Canada, which already had been 
permitting its use for seven years.
115  For a new food product to be approved by FDA for 
use in the United States, the substance’s sponsor (for sucralose, McNeil served as the 
sponsor) must present data that the substance is safe for its intended use; FDA then 
considers factors such as likely human exposure to the substance, toxicological results, 
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and other submitted data.
116  Because of the extensive research and data available for 
sucralose, many believe that FDA should have approved the sweetener rather quickly, 
and at times have criticized FDA’s delay in approving the substance as sheer 
sluggishness.
117 
    2.  Stevia 
  Stevia is the newest addition to the United States market of sugar substitutes. It is 
a natural herb that is roughly two hundred to three hundred times sweeter than sugar.
118  
FDA forbade the usage of stevia as an additive in Celestial Seasonings teas in 1986 and 
then banned the substance as an unsafe food additive in 1991.
119  Some have asserted, 
however, that the stevia ban actually had political motives: to promote the usage of 
aspartame without it being forced to compete with stevia.
120  After pro-stevia activists 
fought to reintroduce the sugar substitute, FDA allowed stevia to be sold and consumed 
as a dietary supplement beginning in September 1995.
121  For a great deal of time, 
however, stevia could be purchased only as a dietary supplement; FDA did not permit the 
public to purchase products containing stevia as a sweetener.
122  As was true regarding 
sucralose, many other countries used stevia safely for years before its usage was 
approved in the United States.
123  
Although no evidence of stevia’s carcinogenicity has been discovered, FDA 
asserted its basis of reluctance to approve the substance as a sweetener to be in part on a 
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Brazilian study that found mice that were fed with stevia to have potentially reduced 
fertility.
124  Therefore, FDA declared that the “[a]vailable toxicological information on 
stevia is inadequate to demonstrate its safety as a food additive or to affirm its status as 
GRAS.”
125   
However, although stevia was not determined to be safe for usage as a food 
additive, its required regulation was less strict under the Dietary Supplement Health and 
Education Act of 1994 (DSHEA) and, hence, FDA declared that “with regard to its use in 
dietary supplements, dietary ingredients, including stevia, are not subject to food additive 
regulations.”
126  Therefore, counterintuitively, customers were permitted to purchase 
children’s vitamins that contained stevia as an ingredient, but not if the vitamins were 
declared to be sweetened with stevia (or even if advertisements for the vitamins simply 
flaunted their sweetness, particularly in comparison to other vitamins).
127  In December 
2008, FDA finally declared the substance to be GRAS, allowing stevia to be sold and 
consumed as a food additive.
128  Currently, the sweetener is marketed most prominently 
as Truvia, but also is sold under the names SweetLeaf, Only Sweet, PureVia, Rebiana, 
and Reb-A.  
  3.  Aspartame 
One of the most controversial, and perhaps even infamous, artificial sweeteners is 
aspartame.  Most commonly known under the brand names of Equal or NutraSweet, 
aspartame also is a prominent ingredient in many frequently-consumed foods and 
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beverages, including diet colas, gum and mints, yogurt, juices, cereals, and gelatin 
desserts.  
    a.  Approval history 
G.D. Searle and Company discovered the substance now known as aspartame in 
1965 while researching amino acids.
129  FDA approved aspartame as a food sweetener in 
1974.
130  After several scientists questioned the sweetener’s safety, however, FDA stayed 
its approval in 1975 and prepared for an evidentiary hearing.
131  When FDA audited 
Searle’s clinical methods, the agency found what it described as sloppy research methods 
on aspartame:  the research contained numerous discrepancies, including mixed 
favorability toward aspartame, numbers that did not add up correctly, and questionable 
testing plans.
132  
A hearing before a public board of inquiry considered three questions:  (1) 
whether aspartame (by itself or paired with glutamate, with which it commonly had been 
combined) could cause mental retardation, brain damage, or damage to neuroendocrine 
regulatory systems; (2) whether aspartame may cause brain neoplasms in laboratory rats; 
and (3) whether, upon considering the answers to the first two questions, aspartame 
should be allowed to be used in foods and, if so, what conditions of use and labeling 
requirements should be enforced.
133  
The board found, by Searle’s research, that aspartame did not cause brain or 
endocrine damage, but it was concerned about the substance’s potential 
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carcinogenicity.
134  The board believed that the three studies that Searle conducted (the 
only evidence they were able to consider) showed an unusually high occurrence of brain 
tumors and that a dose-effect relationship may exist between aspartame and the 
tumors.
135  Thus, the board concluded that further testing should be performed before 
aspartame could be safely marketed.
136   
However, after extensive pressure from Searle, including the threat of a lawsuit 
against FDA, the commissioner overruled the board of inquiry and, on July 18, 1981, 
approved aspartame for use in sweetening foods.
137  In 1982, Searle requested approval 
for aspartame to be used in sweetening carbonated drinks,
138 which FDA quickly 
approved, even denying requests for a hearing from the numerous objectors to the 
approval.
139 
    b.  Safety 
Aspartame is composed of phenylalanine and aspartic acid.
140  According to the 
NutraSweet company, aspartame is not harmful in any way; the company even has 
referenced several organizations confirming its safety (including FDA, Health Canada, 
the European Commission’s Scientific Committee on Food, World Health Organization 
Joint Expert Committee on Food Additives, and the United Nations’ Food and 
Agricultural Organization).
141  Much of the company’s reliance is on antiquated sources, 
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however, including the FDA statement, which places great emphasis simply on the 1981 
approval.
142  It is difficult, therefore, for many to accept NutraSweet’s assertion of 
aspartame’s safety as uncontroverted. 
FDA’s maximum acceptable daily limit of aspartame has been set at fifty 
milligrams per kilogram of body weight, the equivalent of sixteen twelve-ounce cans of 
soda for a 150-pound individual.
143  According to NutraSweet, when aspartame enters the 
body, it “breaks down into its components – the amino acids, aspartic acid and 
phenylalanine, and methanol – which are then absorbed into the blood.  These 
components are used in the body in exactly the same ways as when they are also obtained 
from common foods and beverages.  Neither aspartame nor its components accumulate in 
the body over time.”
144 
Although many claims of aspartame’s dangers are from outlandish sources (some 
of which evoke conspiracy-theory-type arguments), some are more reliable.  The 
American Academy of Pediatrics has expressed fear of the risk of birth defects from 
women with undiagnosed phenylketonuria (a genetic disorder causing phenylalanine to 
build up in the bloodstream and brain tissue, leading to mental retardation and various 
nervous system problems).
145  Other sources, such as Mercola, have expressed concern 
about aspartame’s effects on all individuals (with or without phenylketonuria), believing 
the substance not to be safely processed by the body after digestion because certain 
amino acids that normally are present with phenylalanine in foods, and helping to break it 
down, are not present with it in aspartame, causing phenylalanine to build up in the brain 
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and bloodstream.
146  Others have expressed fear about the effects on a child in the womb 
when its mother consumes aspartame-containing products; because of the child’s low 
weight, it might easily exceed the maximum recommended amount of aspartame even at 
a relatively low level of aspartame consumption by the mother.
147 
Aspartame remains permissible for consumption in the United States.  Though no 
conclusive evidence exists of its carcinogenicity or of other harmful effects, many 
consumers are wary of the sweetener. 
  4.  Cyclamate 
Cyclamate is an artificial sweetener that is less sweet than, but (at least according 
to some) lacks the bitter aftertaste of, its more well-known counterpart, saccharin.
148  
FDA first approved cyclamate for public consumption in 1950 for use by those with 
diabetes or severe obesity; in 1958, in spite of the relatively short history of the safe use 
of the substance, FDA reclassified cyclamate as an acceptable food additive.
149  Women’s 
desire for a more slender figure, beginning in the 1960s, led to a situation in which 
cyclamate was being consumed, at one point, by 75% of the United States population.
150  
The sweetener was no longer for a small subgroup of the population, but instead was 
being used by a majority of people in the United States. 
The wariness of Americans regarding unsafe food additives at the time, however, 
led to cyclamate becoming a suspect product in the 1960s.
151  FDA requested that the 
National Academy of Sciences perform periodic reviews of the substance; in these 
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reviews, the Academy confirmed cyclamate’s general safety, but warned that public 
distribution may lead to unpleasant side effects (such as diarrhea) and potentially harmful 
unknown long-term effects.
152  
A 1968 study showing chromosome breakage in rats after exposure to a 
metabolite of cyclamate caused FDA to provide a recommended daily upper limit of 
cyclamate of 50 milligrams per kilogram of body weight.
153  Another study showed egg 
deformities when cyclamate was injected into chicken eggs; FDA Commissioner Herbert 
Ley took no action to regulate the sweetener more strictly, and Abbott Laboratories 
spokesmen declared cyclamate still to be safe.
154  However, shortly after the release of 
the study on chicken eggs, Abbott Laboratories released the results of a study showing a 
mixture with a ratio of ten parts cyclamate to one part saccharin to result in bladder 
tumors, some of which were cancerous.
155  
Thus, on October 18, 1969, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Robert 
Finch announced at a press conference that usage of cyclamate did, in fact, indicate 
carcinogenicity and, therefore, approval of the substance would be a violation of the 
Delaney Clause.
156  FDA would not permit cyclamate to be used in nonprescription food 
or drinks; products containing cyclamate would be recalled.
157  The following year, FDA 
also forbade usage of the sweetener in prescription products.
158 
We now know that injection of a substance into a chicken egg does not provide 
reliable data for potential human birth defects and that cyclamate does not actually cause 
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birth defects in mammals.
159  Many additional studies were conducted for further 
examination of cyclamate’s potential carcinogenicity, but none showed a link to bladder 
tumors; those that were present in the originally-studied rats allegedly may have been 
caused by cage contamination, parasites or stones in the rats’ bladders, or another outside 
factor.
160  
Thus, in 1984, FDA’s Cancer Assessment Committee declared cyclamate not to 
be carcinogenic.
161  FDA asked the National Academy of Sciences to evaluate the 
substance’s potential to cause cancer; the Academy determined that cyclamate is not a 
carcinogen but that it may be a co-carcinogen (meaning that it may promote the action of 
any carcinogens that already exist in the body).
162  Whether the sweetener caused genetic 
damage remained uncertain.
163  Although, by 1989, cyclamate appeared to be safe and 
not carcinogenic, FDA still has refused to lift the ban on the sweetener, particularly after 
the development of additional non-carcinogenicity-related concerns (including a possible 
risk of links between cyclamate and both testicular atrophy and elevated blood 
pressure).
164  The existence of additional sweeteners that are approved by FDA likely is 
another reason for FDA’s reluctance to lift the ban on cyclamate:  the agency does not 
consider cyclamate to be a necessary addition to the food supply for any legitimate 
reason. 
5.  Neotame 
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  Neotame, made by NutraSweet, is an artificial sweetener that is approximately 
eight thousand times sweeter than table sugar.
165  It has moderate heat stability and 
appears not to accumulate in the body whatsoever.
166  Neotame does produce methanol 
when metabolized; however, the small amount of the substance needed to sweeten foods 
lead it to produce a smaller amount of methanol than do commonly-consumed natural 
foods such as fruit or vegetable juices.
167  Neotame does have the often-disliked aftertaste 
that is common to artificial sweeteners.  The sweetener actually is a modified version of 
aspartame but is more stable and used in much smaller amounts; neotame contains the 
same elements found in aspartame with the addition of two amino acids and two organic 
groups.  
FDA approved neotame for general use in July 2002 after over one hundred 
corporate-sponsored studies showed its safety for the public, including diabetics and 
pregnant women.
168  These studies included those performed both on humans and on 
animals using far higher dosages than expected to be consumed by the general public; 
laboratory animals received the equivalent of fifty thousand cans of neotame-sweetened 
soda every day for a lifetime.
169  Unlike aspartame, neotame needs no warning for 
individuals with phenylketonuria, as it does not produce the same harmful effects on 
members of this population as does aspartame.
170  The consumer advocacy group Center 
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for Science in the Public Interest has stated that it considers only neotame and sucralose 
to be safe artificial sweeteners.
171 
6.  Acesulfame Potassium 
  Acesulfame potassium, commonly known as acesulfame-K, is an artificial 
sweetener that is roughly two hundred times sweeter than table sugar
172 (which is 
approximately the same intensity as aspartame).  Karl Clauss, a German chemist, 
discovered the sweetener in 1967.  Acesulfame potassium is used throughout the world, 
available as a dry powder to be used in foods and beverages, and is an ingredient in many 
frequently-consumed foods and beverages.
173  Studies have shown acesulfame potassium 
not to accumulate in the body.
174 
  Acesulfame potassium almost never is used to sweeten foods alone, but instead 
normally is used in conjunction with other sweeteners.  It frequently is blended with 
sucralose to sweeten foods and beverages.
175  FDA began approving acesulfame 
potassium for use as an additive in 1988 and finally approved it for use in soft drinks in 
1998.
176  The sweetener currently is available for general consumption in the United 
States.  
The National Toxicology Program performed a rodent study on acesulfame 
potassium that showed no increased incidence of tumors due to consumption of the 
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sweetener.
177  The laboratory rats in the nine-month study were given a diet of three 
percent acesulfame potassium,
178 enough of the substance to be equivalent to a human 
consuming over 1300 cans of acesulfame potassium-sweetened soda each day.  Many 
people believe that insufficient evidence of the sweetener’s safety exists, however, and 
have called for further studies regarding whether acesulfame potassium is safe for public 
consumption.
179 
7.  Saccharin 
The artificial sweetener that is most often associated with carcinogenicity is 
saccharin.  It is most commonly marketed and sold as Sweet ‘N Low. Saccharin’s basic 
substance is known as benzoic sulfilimine, which has little to no food energy and is much 
sweeter than sucrose.  Its primary practical downfalls are its unpleasant aftertaste and 
instability when heated.  The history and regulation of saccharin will be examined in 
particular detail, with especial concentration on the excessive politicization of its 
approval. 
    a.  History 
In 1878, the chemist Constantin Fahlberg first produced saccharin while working 
on coal tar derivatives.
180  Because the substance is roughly 350 times sweeter than sugar, 
it attracted users in the early 1900s, including canners desiring to use it to sweeten fruits 
and vegetables.
181  Saccharin’s usage became widespread during the sugar shortages of 
World War I.  During the 1960s and 1970s, it became even more popular as a calorie-free 
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alternative to sugar for dieters.  Although the Office of Environmental Health Hazard 
Assessment placed saccharin on the list of chemicals known to cause cancer in 1989, it 
was delisted as such on April 6, 2001. 
b.  Regulation 
i.  Department of Agriculture 
The first United States agency to regulate saccharin was not FDA; instead, it was 
the United States Department of Agriculture.  Dr. Harvey Wiley, who at that time was the 
head of the Agriculture Department’s Bureau of Chemistry, and is considered the father 
of food and drug regulation in the United States, was the first to raise questions about the 
sweetener’s safety in 1907.
182  President Theodore Roosevelt, however, who did not 
believe in mincing words, stated, quite simply, that “[a]nybody who says that saccharin is 
injurious to health is an idiot.”
183  Understandably, Dr. Wiley was reluctant to pursue his 
concerns about saccharin’s potential safety hazards very far after President Roosevelt’s 
statement, and certainly was not likely to declare the sweetener to be unsafe for public 
consumption. 
The Secretary of Agriculture later referred the matter to the Referee Board of 
Consulting Scientific Experts, which concluded that chronic consumption of saccharin at 
a level of more than 0.3 grams per day could impair digestion.
184  In April 1911, after 
President Roosevelt was no longer in office, the Secretary declared saccharin to be an 
“added poisonous or other added deleterious ingredient” that would cause food to be 
adulterated.
185   
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Later, after discovering that saccharin consumption could not possibly exceed the 
0.3 gram daily level, he retracted his finding that saccharin could harm health, but he still 
maintained that it would adulterate foods by lowering their quality as compared to foods 
that were made with sucrose.
186  The Secretary maintained, however, that physicians still 
would be permitted to prescribe saccharin, and products that contained it, for those who 
are required to avoid sugar due to diabetes or other medical reasons.
187 
      ii.  FDA 
The first long-term study of saccharin’s toxicity was completed in 1951.
188  In 
August 1955, the Food Protection Committee, after a review of the sweeteners performed 
at the request of FDA, declared both saccharin and cyclamate to be nearly completely 
safe; in particular, the Committee declared that the possible digestive problems that were 
associated with saccharin would only present themselves at extremely high dose levels 
(far greater than the amount of the sweetener that one normally would ingest) and that 
data on chronic effects did not indicate any chance of harm at levels that people actually 
were likely to consume.
189  The Food Protection Committee did, however, recommend 
that further study of saccharin (and of cyclamate) be performed, particularly focusing on 
long-term effects and new information that could be gained with scientific and 
technological advances.
190 
After the enactment of the Food Additives Amendment, FDA declared saccharin 
to be GRAS, thereby exempting it from the food additive review process.
191  After tests 
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showing that a mixture of saccharin and cyclamate led to increased incidence of bladder 
tumors in laboratory rats, FDA, believing cyclamate to be the responsible substance, 
removed only cyclamate from its GRAS list in October 1969,
192 allowing saccharin to 
retain its GRAS status.  Removing cyclamate’s GRAS status led, as discussed earlier, to 
an effective ban of cyclamate, which had several consequences: it led the public to 
realize, for the first time, that commonly used food additives may be unsafe; this 
realization in turn caused an increased level of food safety regulation.
193  Cyclamate’s 
GRAS revocation and the resulting effective ban (and public panic) also led to FDA’s 
decision to create a middle ground between a substance having GRAS status and being 
banned: the interim food additive category.
194  Further, because the effective ban of 
cyclamate left saccharin as the only approved artificial sweetener, it led FDA to try 
further to determine whether saccharin is a safe substance to consume.  FDA both asked 
for another study by the National Academy of Sciences and performed its own in-house 
chronic feeding study regarding saccharin’s safety; the sugar industry also performed a 
separate chronic feeding study of saccharin in Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation 
laboratories.
195 
The report by the National Academy of Sciences declared current levels of 
saccharin consumption to be safe but, because levels of consumption likely would 
increase in the future, recommended long-term studies in at least two species; this 
recommendation would be fulfilled by the studies performed by FDA and Wisconsin 
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Alumni Research Foundation.
196  FDA proposed in 1971 to remove saccharin’s GRAS 
status but to permit it to be used as an interim food additive (thereby avoiding the 
effective ban that resulted with the removal of cyclamate’s GRAS status), with specified 
acceptable uses and levels, and a with a requirement that products containing saccharin 
bear a label stating the amount of the sweetener the product contained.
197  At 
approximately the same time, FDA referred to a study in which saccharin-containing 
cholesterol pellets caused an increased incidence of bladder tumors in laboratory rats, 
declaring that the potential carcinogenicity of saccharin needed to be further examined in 
chronic feeding studies.
198  
The interim food additive regulation for saccharin was promulgated February 1, 
1971.
199  By this time, FDA had become aware of the fact that some of the laboratory 
animals in the highest dose group of the study by the Wisconsin Alumni Research 
Foundation had, in fact, developed bladder tumors.
200  This dose group, however, 
consumed enough saccharin to constitute five percent of their daily diet, which was 
roughly one hundred times the maximum exposure permitted by the interim food additive 
regulation; FDA declared the amount of saccharin the animals consumed to be the 
equivalent of a human consuming 875 bottles of diet soda each day.
201  The final results 
of the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation study and of FDA’s own study both 
confirmed the increased occurrence of bladder tumors in male rats.
202 
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FDA then asked the National Academy of Sciences again to review the studies, in 
hopes of obtaining accurate information on saccharin’s safety before its interim food 
additive regulation was set to expire on June 30, 1973.
203  Several complications, 
including other studies already underway and questions regarding the accuracy of the 
completed studies, prevented the timely decision, causing FDA to extend the interim food 
additive regulation.
204  FDA also stated that other “toxicity factors” that occurred only at 
extremely high doses of saccharin, such as high urinary concentrations of sodium, 
depressed weight gain, decreased survival and weight of the pups at weaning, or possible 
bladder stones and irritation, may be responsible for the bladder tumors in the high-dose 
group.
205   
The National Academy of Sciences issued its report, which focused primarily on 
saccharin’s possible carcinogenicity, in December 1974.
206  The report declared that 
saccharin’s safety could not be determined simply by its causation (or lack thereof) of 
tumors in laboratory animals; instead, such a determination must consider all possible 
factors that could cause the bladder tumors before determining whether saccharin is safe 
for human consumption.
207   
Only two of the eleven feeding studies that were conducted regarding saccharin 
(those completed by FDA and Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation) showed possible 
carcinogenicity; these two studies were completed expressly for such a purpose and 
differed from others in that they involved two generations of laboratory animals (to 
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account for possible consumption of saccharin by pregnant women).
208  The National 
Academy of Sciences declared the increased incidence of bladder tumors in FDA’s study 
to be statistically significant, but stated that the similar result in Wisconsin Alumni 
Research Foundation’s study was merely of questionable statistical significance.
209  The 
Academy concluded, however, that the studies had not established conclusively that 
saccharin was (or was not) carcinogenic, primarily because the studies failed to clarify 
whether saccharin itself resulted in the increased incidence of tumors or if, instead, the 
tumors resulted from impurities in the studies.
210  The Academy then recommended 
extensive additional studies, requiring FDA to further defer final determination of 
saccharin’s safety.
211 
In January 1975, Senator Gaylord Nelson asked the General Accounting Office to 
investigate and report on FDA’s handling of the saccharin situation.
212  The General 
Accounting Office issued its report on August 16, 1976, giving saccharin a less-than-
clean bill of health.
213  Because of the serious questions of saccharin’s safety that were 
being examined at that time, the General Accounting Office questioned FDA’s 
justification of continuing to permit its use; the report noted that even some FDA 
scientists were skeptical about discounting the results of tests showing potential 
carcinogenicity.
214  The report concluded that a substance such as saccharin could expose 
the public to unnecessary risk and recommended that the Secretary of the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare direct FDA to reconsider its justification for continuing 
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to permit marketing of saccharin and to consider either banning it or issuing a permanent 
food additive regulation.
215   
After he left office, the FDA Commissioner who refused to ban saccharin, Dr. 
Charles Edwards, stated 
Technically,  I  could  have  banned  saccharin  immediately  under  the 
Delaney Clause, in early 1972, on the basis of those animal studies.  I did 
not take that step because, once again, it was clear to me that the law 
should not be interpreted to yield absurd results.  Saccharin was, at that 
time, the only remaining nonnutritive sweetener on the market. American 
consumers demand the availability of diet food products.  It is irrelevant 
whether  these  diet  products  produce  quantifiable  health  benefits  or 
whether consumers simply like them.  The point is that saccharin, like 
nitrite and many other important food substances, has come to be accepted 
and  expected  by  the  American  public,  and  any  law  which  does  not 
recognize this simply will not work.
216 
Thus, Dr. Edwards candidly admitted that saccharin’s actual health risks would have 
warranted a ban, but the major reason for refusing to allow such a ban was the lack of any 
remaining artificial sweetener that would result. 
Beginning in fall of 1976, FDA drafted two notices,
217 one of which further 
extended saccharin’s interim food additive regulation, noting FDA’s concern about 
saccharin’s safety and its intention to reach a final decision about whether the sweetener 
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could be marketed; the notice was published in the Federal Register on January 7, 
1977.
218  In particular, FDA noted that it expected a final decision shortly after the 
conclusion of the Canadian study, the results of which were expected to be available in 
January 1978.
219  FDA continued to permit marketing of saccharin in the interim period, 
however, declaring its belief that such a decision would not significantly increase the risk 
of harm to the public, yet affirming that it would be willing even to ban saccharin (and 
quickly) if it became necessary to do so.
220 
The day before the notice was published, the reporter Jack Anderson published a 
column asserting that FDA had and was concealing evidence of saccharin’s 
carcinogenicity and that many FDA officials believed the sweetener should be banned.
221  
Indeed, the two-generation feeding study, which addressed many of the uncertainties that 
had been present in earlier feeding studies, confirmed the existence of a significant 
increase in bladder tumors in the rats that had been fed saccharin.
222 
On March 9, 1977, the day after FDA and Canadian officials reviewed results of 
the study, both nations took steps to ban saccharin; in Canada, the sweetener’s use would 
be forbidden in soft drinks beginning July of that year, while, in the United States, FDA 
announced its plans for prompt rulemaking proceedings to withdraw its approval of 
saccharin.
223 
FDA was left with a dilemma: it now had no doubt that saccharin was at least 
somewhat carcinogenic, but had several problems with implementing a ban.  The agency 
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did not want to panic the public (hence, it did not wish to recall saccharin-containing 
products, particularly because it believed they would be the cause of no immediate 
danger to the public) and also faced the difficulty of having no alternative available sugar 
substitute (unlike Canada, which had not banned cyclamate).
224  Thus, the press release 
announcing FDA’s decision to ban the substance based on the Delaney Clause and the 
Canadian study noted saccharin’s potential carcinogenicity, yet stressed the lack of an 
immediate hazard or need for a recall of saccharin-containing products (with the press 
release including, inter alia, the statistic of needing to drink roughly eight hundred diet 
sodas each day for harm to result).
225 
After FDA’s announcement, some criticized the agency for banning saccharin 
without certainty of whether it was, in fact, carcinogenic; the critics used the eight 
hundred-cans-of-soda statistic discussed earlier and the uncertainty of the reliability with 
which high-dose animal studies apply to humans as evidence for their assertions.
226  The 
fact that FDA declared its reason for the ban to be that the law required it rather than 
because of affirmative proof that saccharin does cause cancer merely added to the critics’ 
arguments.
227  This backlash led to calls for congressional hearings to review FDA’s 
decision.
228 
FDA’s response came on April 15, 1977 in its formal proposal for a ban.
229  The 
proposal discussed saccharin’s history, the scientific basis for its ban, the appropriateness 
of high-dose animal studies, and a quantitative risk assessment of saccharin to humans.
230  
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FDA declared the maximum risk of developing bladder cancer as a result of drinking one 
diet soda each day to be four in ten thousand; the risk could be nonexistent, but the 
maximum risk, if everyone in the United States at the time the quantitative risk 
assessment was performed drank one diet soda each day, could result in 1200 additional 
cases of bladder cancer annually.
231  Although available epidemiological data showed the 
existence of no connection between saccharin consumption and an increase in the 
chances of developing bladder cancer, FDA stressed that human studies normally are not 
able to detect small increases in such a risk.
232  The agency also reiterated the 
requirement that saccharin be banned under the Delaney Clause because of its potential 
carcinogenicity.
233  
In response to assertions by diabetics that saccharin was necessary for therapeutic 
use, FDA only allowed the possibility of using it for such purposes for drugs, not for any 
foods.
234  FDA declared that it would be strict in allowing the use of saccharin in drugs, 
however; the only way the sweetener would be permissible would be if it were essential 
to keeping a drug product palatable (to the extent that the relevant population would be 
unlikely to consume the drug product without the added palatability provided by 
saccharin) and the benefit of using saccharin thereby outweighed the risk.
235  FDA also 
noted the potential use of saccharin as a drug in tablet, powder, or liquid form if it were 
clinically proven that the substance had genuine therapeutic benefits for diabetics or 
obese persons if it were accompanied by a warning of its potential carcinogenicity;
236 
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whether FDA genuinely believed such a use to be possible seems quite doubtful, 
however, particularly because of the demanding standards the law has for proving a 
drug’s effectiveness.
237 
      iii.  Political controversy 
FDA’s decision to ban saccharin became highly politically controversial.  The 
Senate Human Resources Committee requested the Office of Technology Assessment to 
prepare a report on methods of testing for carcinogenicity, saccharin’s risks and benefits, 
and potential alternative artificial sweeteners; a draft report endorsed the usage of animal 
testing, though it noted resulting uncertainties when extrapolating the data to humans; the 
conclusion was that saccharin indeed is carcinogenic, although its carcinogenicity to 
humans remained uncertain.
238  Though the report noted that using saccharin may indeed 
have benefits, particularly to diabetics and overweight individuals, it concluded that no 
valid tests confirmed these benefits.
239  The report did not predict the date of available 
alternative sugar substitutes.
240 
Soon after, the National Cancer Institute of Canada released the results of a study 
asserting the existence of a positive association between use of saccharin and bladder 
cancer in human males; according to their data, the use of saccharin made males 1.6 
times more likely to develop bladder cancer, though no similar association was shown in 
females.
241   
Congress remained quite strongly in favor of delaying the ban on saccharin for 
several reasons.  Many believed that the evidence showing that the sweetener was 
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actually carcinogenic in humans, or that its risks to humans outweighed its benefits, was 
uncertain; thus, they believed that consumers should have the freedom to determine 
whether to purchase and consume saccharin and saccharin-containing products given 
their own particular life and health factors (particularly their weight and diabetic 
status).
242   
Therefore, Senator Edward Kennedy and Congressman Paul Rogers, the 
committee chairmen, each wrote a bill proposing both a delay on FDA action and further 
study by an outside group (preferably the often-utilized National Academy of Sciences) 
of the scientific and policy issues in question.
243  Senator Kennedy’s proposal was 
significantly more strict about warnings than that of Congressman Rogers, however:  it 
would mandate posted warnings in places selling saccharin or saccharin-containing 
products (as would the Rogers bill) as well as warnings on product labels and all 
advertisements for saccharin-containing products (which the Rogers bill would not 
require).
244  
Senator Edward Kennedy eventually believed congressional action to be 
inevitable, concluding that saccharin indeed was harmful to the public health and that 
Congress needed to minimize the risk of harm resulting from involuntary exposure to 
saccharin.
245   
The Senate’s version ultimately prevailed and was signed into law on November 
23, 1977, becoming known as the Saccharin Study and Labeling Act (SSLA).
246  The 
SSLA postponed FDA action for eighteen months, directed the Secretary of the 
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Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to arrange for two new studies by the 
National Academy of Sciences (one to study specific scientific issues, including risks and 
benefits, and one to study the scientific and policy issues that occur in the regulation of 
all carcinogenic and otherwise toxic food substances), and required specific warning 
labels to appear on all saccharin-containing products.
247 
As the information on the history of regulation of saccharin reveals, FDA’s 
decisions are not always based simply on research, science, and statistics.  Now, certain 
interest groups have caused the agency’s decisions to be peppered with a degree of 
politicization.  Many supporters of the Delaney Clause likely would argue this to be a 
negative development:  FDA, they would argue, should stick to the facts of a substance’s 
potential dangers and keep politics out of their decision.  After all, the politicization of 
saccharin’s approval may leave FDA less likely to declare a substance unsafe, even in the 
face of uncontroverted scientific evidence showing it to be marginally so, if it is a 
substance the agency fears will have many powerful supporters fighting for it to remain 
on the market.  However, though sheer politicization is unlikely to be considered good by 
anyone, those who support allowing public consumption of substances such as saccharin 
may be responsible for enlightening the public to contrary evidence, which shows the 
substance’s safety, that FDA may gloss over in hopes of an uncontroversial ban.  The 
politicization, at least, may give the public more complete information about questionable 
substances. 
C.  Carcinogens resulting from cooking methods 
Cooking and preservation methods, even traditionally used ones, as FDA 
scientists have stated, frequently contaminate otherwise innocuous foods with 
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carcinogens.
248  Charbroiling and smoking have been known to contaminate the cooked 
food by the addition of polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons; pickling contaminates the 
food with nitrosamines.
249  Far more such examples exist, but have been ignored for 
purposes of FDA regulation under the Delaney Clause because such exposure to 
carcinogens is nearly omnipresent and would be almost impossible to control and 
regulate.
250 
  D.  Other carcinogens 
  Although most sugar substitutes (as the previous discussion indicates), and other 
food additives, undergo rigorous testing before being permitted for sale on the market, 
and often even after their approval, to ensure that they are not carcinogenic, many 
commonly-ingested foods and beverages either are or contain carcinogens.  This is 
unpleasant news to many (albeit perhaps slightly naïve) individuals who believe that, if a 
product is permissible to sell, it cannot possibly be harmful to consume.  In fact, one of 
the nation’s most cherished beverages, coffee, has been reported to contain over one 
thousand chemicals; twenty-eight of these chemicals have been tested, and nineteen of 
the twenty-eight are rodent carcinogens. 
  Coffee, however, is far from the only commonly-eaten food or beverage 
containing carcinogenic ingredients.  Such ingredients appear in numerous products that 
FDA would be highly unlikely ever to ban or even strictly regulate, realizing both the 
dangers of political backlash and sheer improbability of such action.  
  FDA does not always refrain from regulating natural foods.  By 1954, the agency 
had banned the use of natural tonka beans as food because a constituent of the beans, 
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coumarin, had been determined carcinogenic.
251  In 1960, FDA banned the use of safrole 
and oil of sassafras due to potential carcinogenicity; the ban in 1973 was extended to 
include natural sassafras bark for making sassafras tea.
252  Following this, however, FDA 
has not attempted to ban natural food products with carcinogenic constituents, though the 
agency maintains the official position that a substance that is found to be carcinogenic in 
animals can never be considered GRAS (although a substance with a carcinogenic 
constituent may be).
253 
Acetaldehyde, which naturally occurs in coffee and ripe tart fruits, and also is a 
product of oxidation of ethanol, is a probable human carcinogen.
254  Acrylamide occurs 
in cooked starchy foods (e.g., French fries, potato chips, heated bread); it also can be 
found in prunes, olives, and dried pears, as well as certain beverages (most notably coffee 
and prune juice).
255  Safrole is a liquid that typically is extracted from the root-bark or the 
fruit of the sassafras plant in the form of sassafras oil; it also may be synthesized from 
additional compounds.  It is found naturally in numerous plants and spices (e.g., basil, 
black pepper, nutmeg, and cinnamon).  The United States government regards safrole as a 
weak carcinogen in rats. 
  Many commonly eaten foods also contain human mutagens. Mutagens are 
substances, either natural or manufactured, that change human DNA, increasing the 
frequency of mutations.  Although many of these mutations are harmless, producing no 
noticeable effect, or even (on rare occasions) producing beneficial effects, some 
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mutations can be quite dangerous, even lethal, rendering mutagens a category of which 
people are wary.  Though mutagens are not themselves regulated under the Delaney 
Clause, mutagenicity and carcinogenicity often are strongly correlated. Mutagenesis may 
lead to carcinogenic tumor development. 
  The American Council on Science and Health listed the carcinogens that are 
naturally present in many commonly-eaten holiday foods.  The list likely would surprise 
much of the public, many of whom likely would believe a significant number, perhaps 
even most, of the foods on the list to be safe, or at least not affirmatively harmful, for 
public consumption. 
Vegetables often contain mutagenic or carcinogenic (or potentially carcinogenic) 
ingredients.  For example, in carrots, one will find both aniline and caffeic acid.
256  
Aniline is a rodent carcinogen; however, the information concerning the carcinogenicity 
of aniline is contradictory and the International Agency for Research on Cancer has listed 
it as not classifiable as to its carcinogenicity to humans; early linkage to bladder cancer 
now has been attributed to other substances.  Caffeic acid also is a rodent carcinogen, still 
listed as such because of the results of two early studies on rodents.  Tomatoes contain 
benzaldehyde (which is a rodent carcinogen), caffeic acid, hydrogen peroxide (which is a 
mutagen and rodent carcinogen), and quercetin glycosides (which are mutagens and 
rodent carcinogens).
257  Celery contains caffeic acid, furan derivatives (which are 
mutagens), and psoralens (which are mutagens and both rodent and human 
carcinogens).
258  Broccoli spears contain allyl isothiocyanate (which is a mutagen and 
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rodent carcinogen).
259  Baked potatoes contain ethyl alcohol (which is a rodent and 
human carcinogen) and caffeic acid, and sweet potatoes contain ethyl alcohol and furfural 
(which is a mutagen and rodent carcinogen).
260  
Fruits are not immune from potential carcinogenicity either: a fruit tray composed 
of apples, grapes, mangos, pears, and pineapple would contain numerous carcinogens.  
For example, apples contain acetaldehyde, which is a mutagen and rodent carcinogen and 
also a probable human carcinogen
261 and, according to a 2009 report by the International 
Agency for Research on Cancer, a Group 1 human carcinogen.  Apples also contain 
benzaldehyde, quercetin glycosides, and estragole, which is a rodent carcinogen.
262  
Apples, grapes, and mangos all contain caffeic acid.
263  Mangos contain d-limonene, 
which is a rodent carcinogen and also is listed as not classifiable as to its carcinogenicity 
to humans, but as having sufficient evidence to support its carcinogenicity in laboratory 
animals, by the International Agency for Research on Cancer;
264 the Carcinogenic 
Potency Project has estimated that d-limonene causes cancer at a rate approximately 
equivalent to that caused by caffeic acid.
265  Pineapple contains ethyl acrylate, which is 
also a rodent carcinogen.
266 
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Mixed roasted nuts contain aflatoxin (which is a mutagen and both a human and a 
rodent carcinogen) and furfural.
267  Roast turkey and roast beef contain heterocyclic 
amines, which are mutagens and rodent carcinogens caused from cooking certain meats 
at high temperatures, and cranberry sauce contains furan derivatives.
268  Rolls with butter 
would contain acetaldehyde, ethyl alcohol, benzopyrene (which is a mutagen and rodent 
carcinogen that is considered to be a possible cause of lung cancer), ethyl carbamate, 
furan derivatives, furfural, and benzene.
269  Benzene is a rodent carcinogen that is found 
in butter.
270  It is also classified as a human carcinogen by the United States Department 
of Health and Human Services; long-term exposure to benzene undisputedly may lead to 
the development of leukemia.
271 
Holiday desserts may contain carcinogens as well.  Pumpkin pie contains 
benzopyrene, coumarin, methyl eugenol, and safrole.
272  Coumarin is a rodent carcinogen 
that is found in cinnamon; methyl eugenol is a rodent carcinogen found in both cinnamon 
and nutmeg, and safrole, as mentioned earlier, is a rodent carcinogen that is found in 
nutmeg and black pepper; its risk of carcinogenicity is considered roughly equivalent to 
that of limonene and caffeic acid.
273  Apple pie, furthermore contains acetaldehyde, 
caffeic acid, coumarin, estragole, ethyl alcohol, methyl eugenol, quercetin glycosides, 
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and safrole.
274  As discussed earlier in the fruit section, apples are responsible for the 
acetaldehyde, caffeic acid, estragole, and quercetin glycosides.  
Beverages, likewise, are not always quite as innocuous as many consumers might 
imagine or wish them to be.  As already mentioned, coffee is filled with potential 
carcinogens. Wine contains ethyl alcohol and ethyl carbamate.
275  Tea contains 
benzopyrene and quercetin glycosides.
276  Jasmine tea contains benzyl acetate (which is a 
rodent carcinogen).
277 
IV.  Contradictions 
  FDA’s regulations under the Delaney Clause have resulted in several 
contradictory rulings.  The rest of this paper will examine whether such contradictions are 
avoidable and, if they are not, whether they are the lesser evil as compared to FDA’s 
alternative possibilities. 
  A.  Artificial sweeteners 
  One major contradiction is between artificial sweeteners.  As discussed earlier, 
cyclamate was banned fairly quickly, and with relatively little controversy, on less-than-
certain evidence of its carcinogenicity.  Similar (and arguably far stronger) evidence of 
saccharin’s carcinogenicity, though triggering a great deal of concern and controversy, 
did not result in a ban.  
  A good reason for the stronger resistance to banning saccharin is that, at the time 
that the ban would have occurred, it would have left the United States with no approved 
artificial sweetener on the market.  For many, particularly diabetic and obese consumers, 
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this possibility became quite alarming.  Now, however, many additional sugar substitutes 
are available. Some may assert that, with their developments, FDA should rethink 
banning saccharin. 
  However, one must consider whether the real problem was FDA’s decision not to 
ban saccharin or its decision to ban cyclamate on uncertain evidence.  The quick ban of 
cyclamate left FDA with a precedent that was effectively impossible to follow 
consistently.  As noted earlier, the de minimis exception to the Delaney Clause recognizes 
that scientific development has rendered it difficult not to detect some miniscule potential 
carcinogenic effect in almost any food.   
B.  Food additives v whole foods 
As discussed, many natural foods, such as fruits, vegetables, and spices, contain 
carcinogenic or mutagenic substances.  These substances are not chemicals added by 
humans to the foods and, for the most part, would not be declared “added” even under 
FDA’s definition of the term; the carcinogens are naturally present.  However, were FDA 
to begin dictating to the public exactly how many apples they were allowed to consume 
daily, it is safe to say that a backlash would follow (and would do so rather quickly).  
This is the case even though the vast majority of consumers know little, and in many 
cases nothing, of the potential carcinogens or mutagens present in the foods they 
purchase.  Why, then, does FDA have the right (and, according to many, the obligation) 
to regulate (either through forbidding the purchase, limiting the amount that the public 
should consume, or requiring explicit and detailed warning labels) the ability of United 
States consumers to purchase and consume products containing carcinogens that are not 56 
naturally present in the food, even though the danger may be no greater, and in some 
cases significantly less, than that posed by many fruits and vegetables?  
In some cases, of course, the natural foods may be so slightly carcinogenic that 
they would fall under the de minimis exception.  The primary inconsistency involves the 
natural foods that are carcinogenic to a level that precludes their falling under such an 
exception.  Much of the problem here, of course, stems from the Delaney Clause’s 
regulation of food additives, not foods themselves.   
So does the Clause actually provide a meaningful solution to the problem of 
carcinogenicity in foods?  Some say yes, because the Clause undoubtedly reduces some 
incidences of cancer caused by carcinogenic food ingredients.  This cannot be denied: 
even if the Clause is not perfect in its application, it does at least remove some 
carcinogens and carcinogenic-containing food substances from the market.  Others, 
however, may argue that the Clause is more problematic than helpful, particularly 
because it manages to be simultaneously overreaching and underreaching:  it leads to 
bans of certain food additives of which only negligible evidence of carcinogenicity exists, 
even though the tests are imperfect and not all the products actually may be carcinogenic; 
it also fails to ban certain products (whole foods and additives perhaps improperly 
declared to be GRAS) that may be at least as carcinogenic as many of the banned 
products under the Delaney Clause.  
Even though the Clause regulates food additives, however, and, as noted earlier, 
FDA takes an expansive view on what is considered an additive for purposes of 
regulation, FDA has not regulated the carcinogens resulting from traditional cooking or 
preserving techniques.  Understandably, such regulation would be prohibitively difficult; 57 
however, in light of the Agency’s decision not to regulate such carcinogenic food 
additives, the strict regulation of other forms of potentially carcinogenic food additives 
seems somewhat perplexing. 
Further problematic is the fact that FDA initially nearly constantly interpreted the 
Food and Color Additive Amendments to ban the use of any additive that definitely or 
even allegedly contained even small amounts of carcinogenic chemicals, even when the 
additive itself had not been found to be carcinogenic.
278  The agency eventually began to 
use what it called the constituents approach, distinguishing between the actual additive 
and its constituents to determine when the Delaney Clause would be triggered.
279  Thus, 
although the constituent is part of the additive itself, it would not be considered an 
additive for purposes of regulation.
280  
FDA’s justification for the new approach was due to developments in law and 
technology as well as the text of the Delaney Clause.  Regarding the law, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held in 1979 that there is 
“administrative discretion, inherent in the statutory scheme, to deal appropriately with de 
minimis situations.”
281  Thus, according to FDA, it possessed authority to disregard 
carcinogenic chemicals in non-carcinogenic additives if tests demonstrate a “reasonable 
certainty of no harm” that would result from the additive.
282  Regarding technological 
developments, FDA determined that it was able adequately to assess the upper level of 
risk (though the actual level of risk remained uncertain at low levels) from using a 
noncarcinogenic additive with a carcinogenic constituent through the use of 
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extrapolation.
283  Regarding the text of the Delaney Clause itself, the agency noted that it 
does not force deeming an additive unsafe if the additive or any of its chemical 
constituents are found to be carcinogenic, but simply if the additive itself were found to 
be so.
284 
Thus, FDA determined that application of such a procedure would allow nothing 
but “minor levels of carcinogenic chemicals” to pass its screen due to the low acceptable 
levels that would result.
285  The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has 
upheld FDA’s right to make such a determination with regard to color additives, 
declaring that it “agree[d] with the FDA’s conclusion that since it ‘has discretion to find 
that low-level migration into food of substances in indirect additives is so insignificant as 
to present no public health or safety concern … it can make a similar finding about a 
carcinogenic constituent or impurity that is present in a color additive.’”
286 
What, then, is the solution to the various inconsistencies?  Opinions likely divide 
between two opposite solutions:  desiring FDA to regulate potential carcinogens more 
strongly and to do so less strongly.  The former solution undoubtedly would lead to 
numerous absurd results:  requiring FDA to be internally consistent by regulating all 
potential carcinogens, whether whole foods or additives, as strongly as its strictest 
regulation of such a product would lead to the banning of substances such as ethyl 
alcohol and apples.  Even those who think internal consistency by leveling up the amount 
of regulation to the point of equaling the most strongly-regulated foods or food additives 
likely would be appalled at this result.   
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Although the latter solution may lead to problems as well, focusing FDA’s role 
more on providing information rather than regulating and banning carcinogens would be 
beneficial in many ways.  If FDA simply were to perform the necessary tests to determine 
the potential carcinogenicity of various substances and then to require food products to be 
labeled and coded according to carcinogenic potential for the general public, and provide 
more detailed information broken down by age, gender, race, and other factors on a 
website, the public would have access to information necessary to make an informed 
decision about which products to consume. 
As discussed earlier, this approach would be costly for FDA: its tests would have 
to be extensive, and its information provision would need to be quite detailed.  The 
agency would avoid many political costs that it currently faces under the Delaney Clause, 
however, by being the intermediary between warring factions, each of whom is willing to 
blame FDA if the agency decides against its position.  This approach also would avoid 
placing FDA in as many politically heated situations, allowing the agency to maintain its 
professionalism without appearing biased. 
Further potential objections to this position include the fear that, even if FDA 
provided complete information of carcinogenic potential, or if the agency required the 
food manufacturers to do so, a great deal of the public would fail to make a wise choice, 
and would consume an excessive amount of carcinogenic food.  Those arguing this may 
desire a more paternalistic approach by the government, assuming the public is unable, or 
unwilling, to make choices for themselves.  This leads into the classic philosophical 
debate: which should prevail between the government attempting to make the best 60 
decision for all its citizens and the individual liberty to determine what will be best for 
oneself. 
How much control can FDA give up and ensure that the public will have access to 
accurate information about products to consume?  In particular, what would happen if 
FDA were not even to require detailed labeling of carcinogenicity on food products?  
Some may believe that, without the government forcing such information provision, the 
public would be left in the blind.  However, if FDA were only to make public, for 
example, that cyclamate has exhibited some potentially carcinogenic tendencies, and not 
to require cyclamate-containing products to bear a warning of carcinogenic potential 
(assuming, however, that the product would at least contain the mention of cyclamate in 
its ingredients), a likely result is that products not containing cyclamate would advertise 
this proudly on their packaging.   
An example of this phenomenon is the current public resistance to products 
containing monosodium glutamate (MSG) or trans fats.  Although FDA has enforced no 
ban on either of these substances, nor required an enormous warning label on products 
containing them, products without these additives proudly declare “No MSG!” or “No 
trans fats added.”  Thus, although products containing carcinogenic substances should 
contain a mention of their presence in the listing of ingredients, and certainly should be 
penalized for falsely declaring themselves to be free from them, it appears than an 
explicit warning may not be the only way to inform consumers of the safest products for 
consumption. 
FDA should, however, either maintain or directly oversee the maintenance of a 
publicly-available website containing information of all potential carcinogens, as well as 61 
the extent to which each may be carcinogenic to specific subgroups of the population.  
This information should be stated in sufficiently simple terms to allow even those without 
a particularly high level of education to be able to understand and meaningfully apply 
what they have read. 
Overall, it appears that FDA would better serve its purpose by refraining from 
being involved in the politics that have surrounded Delaney Clause regulation, and the 
paradoxical results stemming therefrom, and instead focusing on determining 
carcinogenicity of food additives (and of food themselves) and ensuring that the public 
has adequate access to information of such carcinogenicity.  As noted earlier, however, 
despite the benefits of such an approach, the likelihood that FDA actually will decide to 
implement such a strategy seems quite small, due to the necessary costs, the general lack 
of desire for any governmental body to give up some of its control, and the likelihood of 
severe criticism and a resulting backlash from staunchly pro-regulatory groups and 
individuals. 